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MORALITY
IN RACE RELATIONS
JOSEPH T. LEONARD, S.S.J.*
T HERE HAS BEEN a general acceptance of the principle that racial
discrimination is immoral. But there still remain the problems of
implementing this and putting it into practice in individual instances as
well as in institutionalized functions. After enunciating the dictum that
compulsory racial segregation is immoral there still remain theological
problems. Nor are these limited to the question "What am I obliged to
do to avoid sin?", posed as a problem for the minimal function of the
moral theologian, but also extend to the questions "What is more vir-
tuous?"; "What can I do more to fulfill the law of charity?"; or "How
can I best act to build up the Mystical Body?", as well as devising
methods of inculcating, teaching, preaching, demonstrating, and moti-
vating such reaction-in other words, the problem of putting our beliefs
into practice.
To consider what is probably the most theologically involved prob-
lem, although at first glance it may seem least complicated, we raise
the question of the previous silence of the Church regarding the moral
issues involved in racial segregation. Nor should we think this is strictly
an abstract and speculative question. Catholics who have lived in a
society in which they not only beheld segregation practiced daily by
their neighbors, but also practiced it themselves in their schools and
churches, are now faced with a dilemma when they hear that actions
which, as Catholics, they were able a short time ago to condone and
even to practice, are now considered immoral and sinful. For example,
sometime ago, following the historic cloture vote on the civil rights de-
bate in the Senate, the press reported that Senator Richard Russell of
Georgia had drawn attention to the support and activity of the clergy
in behalf of the bill on the grounds that it was a moral issue. He raised
the question as to why, if this involved moral issues, the clergy were two
centuries late, declaring: "If it is a great moral issue today, it was a
great moral issue at the ratification of the Constitution of the United
* S.T.L. (1957), S.T.D. (1963), Catholic University, Washington, D. C.
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States."' Considering the emotional ele-
ments necessarily involved in these situa-
tions, we must have, at least, a sympathy
for those who are sincere in their confu-
sion and questioning.
Historically it is impossible to deny that
from the end of the Civil War until modem
times, an almost universal silence regard-
ing the moral issues involved in segre-
gation blanketed the ecclesiastical scene.
The American hierarchy and theologians
remained mute, and this at a time when,
according to C. Vann Woodward's study,
enforced segregation was growing and ex-
tending more and more into all areas of
life.2 An outstanding exception and an out-
spoken opponent of segregation on moral
grounds was Archbishop Ireland of St.
Paul, but he and a handful of his con-
temporaries stand practically alone in their
vocal opposition.
What caused this silence? Was it merely
disinterest in the welfare of the American
Negro or disregard for important contem-
porary social issues and needs? Was it
necessitated by the fear that contradiction
of the practices and trends of the day
would merely consolidate antagonism to-
ward the Church and alienate the faithful
who, because of social environment and
pressures, were not ready or willing to hear
or accept such teaching? Is this the same
question of silence posed by Hochhuth's
controversial play, The Deputy?
I do not believe that these or similar ex-
planations are sufficient to fully explain
this silence. Rather, it would seem that the
immorality of compulsory segregation was
not known or realized at that time either
1 Washington Post, June 11, 1964.
2 WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW (rev. ed. 1957).
by the theologians or the ecclesiastical au-
thorities. The principle of "separate but
equal" had received legal approval in 1896
in the Plessy v. Ferguson3 decision when
the Supreme Court made an unrealistic
distinction between "political" equality and
"social" equality before the law. This de-
cision gave justification for the further dis-
tinction between racial discrimination and
racial segregation which was in use for
a half-century by the courts and resulted
in decisions which held that, if an action
were found to be segregation, it was law-
ful; but if it were found to be discrimina-
tion, it was unlawful.
The same distinction carried over into
the area of morals, and, at least implicitly,
it was held that discrimination against the
Negro was immoral, but that compulsory
segregation (provided, of course, that rea-
sonably "equal" facilities were available)
was not immoral. This was the principle
used in formulating moral judgments by
theologians and with few exceptions was
universally accepted. Whether or not ti-
midity in critically re-examining this prin-
ciple and thus disturbing the status quo
played a significant role in the continuance
and predominance of the principle is im-
possible to show here historically. What
was lacking was the knowledge and the
realization that all enforced and compul-
sory racial segregation was discrimination.
Even during slavery, however, there was
an awareness of the moral implications in
race relations. For example, Bishop Au-
guste Verot, when he was Vicar Apostolic
of Florida, in a sermon on slavery
preached in St. Augustine in 1861, spoke
against the activities of the abolitionists
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
and their claims, but he also indicated that
the Church had condemned the slave trade
and he re-emphasized the duties and rights
of both slaves and masters. And although
he maintained the strict property rights of
owners to their slaves, nevertheless, he
spoke of the rights of free Negroes and
condemned as unjust state laws which con-
strained and impeded their liberty. He
pointed out that it was as unjust to harass
a free Negro because of his race as it was
to harass the Irish or the Germans because
of nationality or religion. 4
However, a distinction between dis-
crimination and segregation was made
legally and morally, and it required the
economic, educational, psychological, polit-
ical, and social community experiences of
a half-century to give proof that the dis-
tinct'on-no matter how valid speculatively
-was not valid in practice. Full recogni-
tion of this was not made juridically or
legally until the school decisions in 1954
and 1955, and theologically was not made
explicit until Archbishop Rummel's state-
ment in 1956 and the American hier-
archy's statement Discrimination and the
Christian Conscience in 1958. This latter
indicated the identification of segregation
and discrimination stating:
any form of compulsory segregation, in it-
self and by its very nature, imposes a stig-
ma of inferiority upon the segregated
people. Even if the now obsolete Court
doctrine of "separate but equal" had been
carried out to the fullest extent, so that all
4 This sermon was preached on January 4, 1861,
and was entitled A Tract for the Times: Slavery
and Abolition. The sermon received wide pub-
licity and was quoted freely by the pro-slavery
forces. Eventually its publication was suppressed
by Secretary of State William Seward in Balti-
more. It was published in two parts in The Free-
mans Journal, June 18, 1864 and July 9, 1864.
11 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1965
public and semipublic facilities were in fact
equal, there is, nonetheless, the judgment
that an entire race, by the sole fact of race
and regardless of individual qualities, is
not fit to associate on equal terms with
members of another race.
And the full recognition of this identity,
and its acceptance both speculatively and
practically, by all Christians is still the
problem facing teachers of Christian doc-
trine.
I believe that this condemnation of seg-
regation is the result of a greater and a
deeper realization of personalist values and
of human dignity, guided by and united
with new and additional knowledge and
data received from the various sciences-
sociology, psychology, history, economics,
and pedagogy. It does not involve or imply
a change in moral teaching compelled or
forced by social pressures or power poli-
tics. Can we not find a parallel situation
obtaining in the moral questions involved
in the problem of usury or "interest tak-
ing"; the right of the working man to
form unions; the right of a son or a daugh-
ter to select their own spouses; the moral-
ity of prize fighting?
Public Accommodations Laws
How often have we heard: "You can't
pass a law which will make me like some
one," or "You can't legislate morality"?
As these are applied to proposed civil
rights and public accommodation laws, we
can see that there is an underlying belief
that the purpose of these laws is to compel
the performance of virtuous acts by indi-
vidual citizens. Nothing can be further
from the truth. It is not the purpose of a
human law to compel Mrs. Murphy in her
rooming house to perform virtuous acts or
even to refrain from sinning so that she
will increase in holiness and virtue. The
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goal of civil law is to protect, promote, and
advance what theologians and philosophers
call "common good"; what legislators and
lawyers term "public policy." St. Thomas
described the proper function of human
law as: ". . not commanding every vir-
tuous act, but only those which can be
ordered to the common good."5
A relationship between common good
and a privately owned business is more ap-
parent in the case of modern corporations
which because of their size and services
enjoy a quasi-monopoly in serving society,
such as the telephone company, power and
light companies, public carriers, etc. Here
it can easily be admitted that these firms,
even though privately financed and owned,
are not free to select their customers on
arbitrary grounds such as race or religion,
but must serve the general public, even
though the owners have a right to a rea-
sonable profit and return from their capital
investment. But in considering businesses
of lesser size and importance, their rela-
tionship to common good becomes propor-
tionately more difficult to see. And this is
precisely why the opponents of public ac-
commodations laws have seized on the
question of Mrs. Murphy's boarding house.
Two or three large hotel chains may be
able to control the disposition and avail-
ability of accommodations in certain areas,
and if and when their control is irrespon-
sibly or selfishly utilized, the common good
can be injured. But Mrs. Murphy's board-
ing house, with its three, four, or five ten-
ants, is not the Hilton chain. Obviously,
the manner in which she operates her es-
tablishment cannot have such an apparent
and deeply felt impact on the housing
available in the entire area.
5 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II q. 96, art. 3; see alto
I-I q. 96, art. 2.
Then shouldn't small businesses be ex-
empt from legal restrictions and regulations
and allowed the exercise of a right to select
their own customers? The proposed civil
rights bill makes provision for this to a
certain degree and has provided that room-
ing houses with no more than five tenants
and in which the proprietor also makes
his home, will be exempted. Here, how-
ever, the important thing to bear in mind
is that every privately owned business, no
matter how small, setting itself up to pro-
vide services or products to the public ac-
quires by that fact a special relationship
and responsibility to the common good.
Now, such small businesses as Mrs.
Murphy's or the shoeshine stand or corner
newspaper dealer obviously cannot indi-
vidually make a great impact on the com-
mon good. If these businesses, in individ-
ual cases, operate without concern for the
common good and merely for personal or
egocentric goals, we usually anticipate that
the economic law of the market place will
fill up the vacuum and other merchants
will supply the service or product at least
for economic motives. But, it should at
the same time be apparent that if there is
a proliferation of selfishly operated enter-
prises, it is possible and likely that the
common good will suffer. For example, if
a gas station owner refuses to sell gas and
oil to Catholics, we know that the station
in the next block will only be too glad to
supply those needs. However, if all the
owners adopt such a policy of refusal,
either in concert by conspiracy or indi-
vidually by happenstance, the situation
would be different and Catholics in that
area might well be demobilized and de-
pendent on "shank's mare" for transpor-
tation. A similar parallel can be drawn in
instances of other small businesses-news-
stands, grocery stores, clothiers, etc. If a
line is drawn exempting some of these
from the ambit of the law, as has been
done in the civil rights bill now being con-
sidered, it should be remembered that de-
termination of that line is the result of a
prudential judgment and it is not an ab-
solute.
Civil Rights Demonstrations
One of the burning issues of the race
problem today is the question of demon-
strations and civil disobedience. A thor-
ough theological study of the question of
civil disobedience is needed not only as
it applies to race relations, but also as
pertinent to other areas of modern life.
For our purposes today, we are limited to
a few considerations. As a general prin-
ciple, it must be said that not every form
of demonstration is justified. It is imme-
diately obvious that civil disobedience or
demonstrations which involve wanton de-
struction of property or injury of innocent
persons cannot be justified; marauding
bands, whether of whites or Negroes, har-
assing and torturing defenseless victims,
cannot point to the existence of other in-
justices as a title for their own existence,
nor can bombings of homes, churches, or
schools be considered within the ambit of
licit or proper protests.
But in considering the morality of peace-
fully conducted protests and demonstra-
tions and civil disobedience, it is necessary
to weigh several factors. From experience,
it is apparent that these protests, even
when conducted according to the non-
violent principles advocated by Martin
Luther King, can be an occasion of riots,
street fighting, and disturbances of the
bond of peace. However, the moralist, in
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judging the liceity of a demonstration,
should not limit himself to a consideration
of the data as to the likelihood or prob-
ability of such a disturbance. In other
words, the danger to which the peace of
the community is exposed and the perti-
nence of the protest to a definite objective
should not be the sole considerations.
Other factors should and must be pond-
ered. Some of these are (1) the success
which such protests will achieve. This is
not to be understood as indicative of a jus-
tification of means because of success, but
that following the principle of the two-fold
effect, the greater the chance of success
the more easily we can risk a danger. Just
as in medical practice, the greater the suc-
cess of a drug, the more readily we can
justify its use even though there is a risk
of undesirable side effects. So too in civil
rights protests, the greater the possibility
of success, the more readily can the de
facto common good be exposed to danger.
(2) The moral evaluation must also in-
clude consideration of the psychological ef-
fects of the protest on the Negro com-
munity. Participation in a peaceful and non-
violent demonstration may be, for some Ne-
groes, their first opportunity to assume and
participate in social or civic adult responsi-
bility. In the search for liberty, the demand
or the protest can be considered the first
actual step of liberty or the first exercise
of a newly found freedom, and this will
inevitably have profound psychological ef-
fects. Following the bus boycott in Mont-
gomery, Martin Luther King reported that
there was a complete and astonishing re-
vitalization of the sense of human dignity
in the Negro community there with a re-
sultant increase of self-respect which
brought new standards of deportment and
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conduct throughout the Negro community.6
Such beneficial results, even though they
are not so immediately apparent or are not
the goal and purpose of the protest, must
be included among the data considered in
forming a moral judgment.
(3) There must be a prudential evalua-
tion of the situation to determine whether
or not a do-nothing attitude will persist if
the protest does not occur. In speaking of
the common good, we must remember that
the exclusion of the Negro population from
participation in the institutions and bene-
fits of society means that this common
good is actually what Fr. Gerald Kelly,
S.J., calls the de facto common good as
contrasted with the de iure common good
in order to emphasize the dynamic charac-
ter of common good and its susceptibility
to continuous improvement.
The latter (de lure) is a state of well-being
that should exist in a society; the former
(de facto) is a state of well-being, perhaps
far below the ideal, which does exist in a
society. A de facto condition might indeed
be called "good" only in the sense that it
could be worse.7
The danger to be avoided is the considera-
tion of common good as completely static,
incapable of further perfection and an ab-
solute, or even the formulation of a judg-
ment on the morality of the effects of the
protest or demonstration only in terms of
what is actually only the "white man's
common good"-that is, a privileged posi-
tion in a social caste system for whose de-
fense and retention he may or may not be
willing to fight and upon this willingness or
6KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 187-88
(1958).
7Kelly, The Common Good and the Socio-Eco-
nomic Order, 7 CATHOLIC THEO. Soc. AM. 90
(1952).
unwillingness, the public peace and con-
cord depend.
Medieval Treatment of the Jews
We can anticipate, even though there is
presently some confusion as to the word-
ing, that the issuance of a declaration by
the Second Vatican Council on the Jews and
anti-Semitism will remove one argument
from the arsenal of the racial segregation-
ist. For some time, it has been common-
place to point to the treatment of the Jews
by the Church, especially the decrees of
Paul IV and Pius V and the various con-
ciliar enactments of the Third and Fourth
Lateran Councils, as examples of papal
and conciliar approval of segregation, with
the ultimate intention to demonstrate that
the present day theological teaching on
the immorality of segregation contradicts
the tradition and moral practices of the
Church.
Omitting a survey of the history of anti-
Semitism, I believe that the basic explana-
tion of this situation is not only that these
decrees, both papal and conciliar, do not in-
volve Catholic dogmatic or moral teaching,
but also that they merely represent imple-
mentation of a medieval concept of political
society as a sacral and consecrated society
which automatically placed non-Christians
outside the mainstream of the community.
It may well be, with hindsight, that we can
say these medieval enactments were un-
justified and may indeed now raise the
question whether it would not be condu-
cive to a better understanding to remove
any vestige of doubt or ambiguity, if the
present Council should explicitly withdraw
and retract these earlier decrees. At any
rate, it should be clear that such decrees
were restrictions founded on religious dif-
ferences in a non-pluralistic society and
not on racial differences such as the Nazi
anti-Semitic policies. In the medieval so-
ciety, a Jewish convert was fully accepted
in the Christian community, with his rights
protected. Even the Jewish community was
enjoined from disbarring him from heredi-
tary rights or privileges as can be seen in
a decree of the Third Lateran Council.
If by the grace of God any should be con-
verted to the Christian faith, they shall not
be disinherited, for those so converted
ought to be in better circumstances than
before they received the faith. But if the
contrary has taken place, we enjoin the
princes and rulers of those localities under
penalty of excommunication that they take
action to the effect that their inheritance
and possessions be restored to them ex
integro.
Interracial Marriage
There can be no doubt but that the so-
cial acceptance or rejection of a married
couple by family and friends can exert a
great influence on the success or failure of
the marriage. Ordinarily, in our society,
the acceptance of a racially homogeneous
marriage is determined solely on person-
ality or social qualifications of the couple.
The same cannot be said of the interracial
marriage in the United States. In this in-
stance, there is frequently a rejection of the
couple, as husband and wife, even though
individuals may still be acceptable to fam-
ily or friends. It is usually the family of
the white partner which persists in refusing
to recognize such marriages, although in
rarer instances and with a lesser degree of
persistence and isolation, it may be the
Negro family. Obviously, rejection is an
added factor which must be considered in
interracial marriage because in addition to
the trials and problems which beset every
marriage in our modern society, the inter-
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racial marriage has this additional handi-
cap. In fact, this has led some to question
whether, under present circumstances, the
hardships and rejection which such mar-
riages will face, as well as the difficulties
which confront the children, do not usually
render such marriages imprudent.
In considering such marriages, I think
we have to admit that there has been some
amelioration and easing of the opposition
to them. This is particularly true in larger
cities which have educated and sophis-
ticated populations. The large number of
"war brides" from Japan, Korea, and other
Asian nations have made interracial mar-
riages more visible and more common, and
the "shrinking of the world" through com-
munication has made the appearance of
other racial groups less rare. The result has
been that, in the past twenty years, resist-
ance to interracial marriage has been con-
siderably lessened, particularly in refer-
ence to opposition after the marriage has
been contracted, and it is rare to find a so-
ciety so unalterably opposed that it would
openly and totally isolate the offending
partners today.
In considering the prudence of inter-
racial marriage today, I do not feel that
the isolation and rejection which arise
carry as much weight as was evident
twenty-five years ago. Obviously, there is
still some and it must be considered, but
it would seem that, except in rare instances,
because of peculiar local or private cir-
cumstances, the opposition of society in
general would not be a major deterrent to
the prudential quality of such a marriage.
Further, although such sociological fac-
tors must be considered, they should not
be over-emphasized. We must remember
(Continued on page 264)
past several centuries. In a negative fash-
ion, the symposium is enlightening because
it brings home the fact that broad based
acceptance of natural law 'by American
thinkers is not close at hand. Running
throughout the commentaries upon Profes-
sor Rommen's paper is the viewpoint that
natural law represents either a closed legal
system or a lowest common denominator
among legal philosophies which hold forth
man's "fulfillment" as the end of law. Pro-
fessor Friedman, for example, posits that
while man seeks enduring standards and
certainty in lawmaking, nevertheless, even
the Nuremberg judgments may be sup-
ported on a purely positivistic basis.
The final section of the work, devoted to
Judicial Reasoning, contains contributions
from such scholars as Professors Freund,
Levi, Wechsler, and Henkin. This material
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(Continued)
that we are talking of a sacrament capable
of producing, during the entire existence of
the marriage, those graces which will en-
able the couple to fulfill their Christian
DECISIONS
(Continued)
not ration justice." '18 Is not justice rationed
in favor of the wealthy defendant when he
is represented by proficient and experi-
enced counsel, as against the indigent who
is forced by decisions such as that in
Peters to prepare and present his own ap-
peal to the Supreme Court? Since the
Supreme Court has ordered counsel to be
appointed for indigents at criminal trials,
Is Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not
Meet The Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J.
435 (1963).
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continues the nationwide discussion
touched off by Professor Wechsler's theory
of "neutral principles." Interesting ques-
tions are raised concerning possible con-
flict between Professor Wechsler's formu-
lation and the Supreme Court's self-im-
posed limitation of deciding only the case
before it. Professor Levi contributes valu-
able insights on an important aspect of
stare decisis: is it more imperative when
the earlier decision interprets a statute
rather than a principle of common law.
This book is certainly not to ,be classed
as light reading. It is too eclectic to be of
real assistance to a student beginning his
inquiry into jurisprudence. It should, how-
ever, prove a valuable source for scholars
desiring to obtain a cross-section of cur-
rent views on the subjects of natural law,
civil disobedience, and the judicial process.
commitment. If we overlook this gracious
aspect of the sacrament of marriage or
even minimize it, we are in danger of re-
ducing the sacrament to a purely natural
state influenced only by economic, social,
or psychological pressures and motives.
the holding of Peters seems inconsistent
with the philosophy inherent in prior case
law. By virtue of the instant case, the in-
digent's guarantee of representation will
be terminated not in a lower court, but
rather at the doorstep of the court from
which that guarantee emanates. It becomes
evident that only with respect to appeals
to the Supreme Court will the discrimina-
tion between rich and poor, arising from
a denial of appointed counsel, survive.
This, in the very court which so em-
phatically condemned any discriminatory
practice based on wealth!
